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RECENT DECISIONS
EVIDENCE - EQUAL PROTECTION - DEFENDANT GRANTED
GREATER LATITUDE TO PROVE DISCRImINATORY PROSECUTION. -
Appellant, owner of a three-story brownstone house in New York
City,' was convicted of violations of the Multiple Dwelling Law 2
and the Administrative Code,3 in that she failed to obtain a rooming
house permit, made unlawful alterations, and failed to repair or
replace a broken sprinkler valve. As her defense, she attempted
to establish the malicious motive of the complainant, by offering
evidence to show that her prosecution closely followed her exposure
of corrupt practices in the Department of Buildings. The Court
of Appeals, reversing the decision of the appellate term, which
refused to admit into evidence facts tending to establish bad motive,
granted a new trial and held, in a 4-3, membrandum opinion, that
appellant was unduly restricted in her attempt to prove unequal
protection and that she should have had a fair opportunity to
establish bad motive at trial. People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901,
200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964).
Of paramount importance in construing a case in which a
reversal is granted is an understanding of the basic concept upon
which lower court decisions may be overturned. The general
rule is that appellate courts can only reverse lower court decisions
because of prejudicial error.4  This rule is notably applicable
in the area of criminal procedure.5 A grasp of this concept is
essential in order to crystalize the position of the instant case
in the historical development of the concept of equal protection.
In this country, the state exercise of arbitrary power affecting
the rights to life, liberty or the pursuit of happiness has been
regarded as intolerable and violative of constitutional standards. 6
Such rights may be impinged by the enforcement of a statute
which is invalid on its face,7 or by discriminatory enforcement of
a valid statute.3
'Brief for Respondent, p. 2, People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901, 200
N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964).
2 N.Y. MULT. DwELL. LAW §§ 187, 300, 302. Section 187, in part, sets
standards of maintenance for sprinkler systems; §300 provides for submission
of plans and prohibits alteration at variance with the plans submitted without
prior approval of the Building Department; and § 302 requires vacation of
the premises if they are not in compliance with the building regulations.
3 N.Y.C. ADM N. CODE § D26-3.22 regulates the operation of rooming
house accommodations and single room occupancy in view of health and
safety standards.
4 E.g., Fa. 1. Civ. P. 61; CPLR 2002.5 E.g., ALA. CoDE tit. 15, § 389 (1940); CAL. PEN. CoDE § 1258; IND.
ANN. STAT. § 9-2320 (1905); N.Y. CODE CaMr. PRoc. § 542; HARNO, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PRoCEDuRE 764-65 (4th ed. 1957).6 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
7 McFarland v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86-87 (1916):
People v. Munoz, 9 N.Y.2d 51, 60, 172 N.E2d 535, 540, 211 N.Y.S.2d 146,
153 (1961).
s Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130-31 (1940). In this case, a dis-
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The standard to be employed in judging claims of dis-
criminatory enforcement of a statute, valid on its face, was first
stated by the Supreme Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.9 In that
case, petitioner, a Chinese subject, was refused a license to carry
on his laundry business although he had complied with all the
relevant health and safety requirements.' 0 Imprisoned for non-
payment of a fine incurred because he was operating without a
license, the petitioner established that the board of supervisors
discriminated by arbitrarily withholding licenses from those of
Chinese ancestry, whereas licenses were freely granted to Caucasians
in similar circumstances." The Court, in ordering the prisoner's
release, held that the unequal administration of a law, resulting in
"unjust and illegal discriminations" between similarly situated
persons, constitutes a denial of the equal justice granted by the
Constitution.' 2
In Ah Sin v. Wittman,13 the Court extended the Yick Wo
doctrine to the criminal law. There, petitioner was imprisoned
for the violation of a gambling ordinance, and alleged that it was
enforced exclusively against the Chinese. The Court's position in
regard to this allegation was that the defendant would have to
establish not only the enforcement of the ordinance against Chinese,
but also that there were other offenders against whom the law
was not enforced.' 4 Therefore, the Court re-established and clarified
the defendant's burden of proof, showing that without proof that
others had violated the law with impunity, discrimination could not
be demonstrated. 5 In conjunction with this holding, it is also well
to note that conviction of a guilty party would be a violation of
the equal protection clause if other violators were not prosecuted.
This is true because the constitutional provision not only guarantees
valid laws, but also their equal enforcement.' 6
The Yick Wo doctrine was further defined in Snowden v.
Hughes.'7 There, the petitioner was a candidate for nomination
to the office of representative in the state assembly. Under a
proportional representation scheme, there were to be two Republican
candidates, and in this instance, nomination was tantamount to
election. The petitioner polled the second highest total vote, but
cretionary power of jury selection, under a statute valid on its face, was
abused, resulting in exclusion of qualified Negroes from jury service.
9 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
10 Id. at 358.
"1 Id. at 359.
12 Id. at 374.
Is198 U.S. 500 (1905).
14 Id. at 507-08.
'5 Ibid.
16 East Coast Lumber Term. v. Town of Babylon, 174 F.2d 106, 112 (2d
Cir. 1949).
"7321 U.S. 1 (1944).
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the individual defendants, who constituted the State Primary Can-
vassing Board, designated only one nominee.' 8 The Court held that
appellant's assertion that respondent's action was willful, malicious
and arbitrary, and hence was "an unequal, unjust and oppressive
administration" of the state laws, was not sufficient to state a cause
of action.' 9 The Court also examined and determined the ways
in which "intentional and purposeful discrimination" can be demon-
strated. The first is intrinsic, in which the action itself is uncon-
stitutional,20 e.g., where the action taken is authorized by a statute
which contravenes constitutional guarantees.21 The second is ex-
trinsic, in which evidence must be educed which indicates unequal
treatment of individuals or classes,2 2 e.g., where, although the
statute is not unconstitutional, its administration is at variance with
the concept of equal protection.23
In New York, the recent cases dealing with the equal protection
clause have adhered to the Supreme Court's position on the minimum
proof necessary to establish discriminatory enforcement. 4 In
People v. Friedman,25 the court of appeals held that a claim of
discriminatory enforcement was without merit. Although the offer
of proof by defendant, a meat-seller, indicated some non-enforcement
as to other businesses, it was not extensive enough to indicate that
the statute was discriminatorily enforced.2 6  Likewise, in People v.
Utica Daws Drug Co., 2 7 the defendant, in violation of a "blue
law," 28 sold non-drug items on Sunday. Admitting the violation, he
alleged intentional discrimination against "cut-rate" stores in the en-
forcement of the statute, since stores of other types were not prose-
cuted.2 9 The trial court held that defendant's contentions, if estab-
lished, would constitute a defense, but excluded evidence designed to
prove that twenty-one other drug stores had engaged in the sale of
similar commodities.3 0  The appellate division, in reversing the con-
18 Id. at 3-4.
19 Id. at 10.
20Id. atS.
21 See cases cited note 7 supra.
22 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1,,8 (1944).
23 People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rep. 852 (Super. Ct.
1960).
24 People v. Friedman, 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), appeal dis-
missed, 341 U.S. 907 (1951); People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., 16 App. Div.
2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1962).
25 302 N.Y. 75, 96 N.E.2d 184 (1950), appeal dismussed, 341 U.S. 907
(1951).26 Id. at 80-81, 96 N.E.2d at 186-87.
27 16 App. Div. 2d 12, 225 N.Y.S.2d 128 (4th Dep't 1962).
28 N.Y. PEN. LAW § 2147 (delineating items which may be sold on
Sunday).
29 People v. Utica Daw's Drug Co., supra note 24, at 13-14, 225 N.Y.S.2d
at 129-30.30 Id. at 14, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 130.
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viction, held that non-enforcement as to others was evidence relevant
to the question of discriminatory enforcement."'
Thus, until the present case, the law had been clear and
unwavering in its position that a demonstration of unequal protec-
tion of the laws, through discriminatory enforcement of a valid
statute, would be impossible without demonstrating both enforcement
against a defendant and unprosecuted violations by others similarly
situated. The absence of prosecution would have been indicative
of intentional and purposeful discrimination.
However, in the instant case, the appellant, Mrs. Walker,
offered to introduce evidence relative only to the fact of enforcement
against her, namely, the malicious motive which activated the
Building Department's prosecution. She dismissed, as insignificant,
the question of enforcement against others . 2
The majority, in a cryptic memorandum opinion, stated that
the appellant had been unduly restricted in her attempt to prove
that she had been denied equal protection of the laws. The Court
noted that its holding did not include a finding that the appellant
had not demonstrated intentional discrimination in her prosecution.
The vagueness and the terse nature of this opinion might well
lead to an observation that the majority was concerned with appel-
lant's plight at the trial. The trial judge's refusal to admit into
evidence background information tending to show motivation or
to listen to argument that the facts disclosed intentional discrimi-
nation 8 considerably weakened her case. Wishing to grant the
appellant a full opportunity to establish her contention, the majority
decided that more latitude was necessary in this area of proof.
The minority, on the other hand, reasoned that since appellant's
offers of proof were directed to a showing of bad motive alone,
she could not have thus established a valid defense. This con-
clusion, in the minority's view, is mandatory since she admitted the
existence of the violations which led to her convictions, in both
lower courts, and since the statutes were generally enforced against
others similarly situated throughout the city, as shown by almost
80,000 violations filed by the Building Department in the three
immediately preceding years."' Thus, as in the Snowden case, the
validity of the statute was not drawn in issue, nor was any claim
made that the law was not enforced against other violators. The
s1 Id. at 15, 225 N.Y.S.2d at 131.
32 Reply Brief for Appellant, pp. 8-9, People v. Walker, 14 N.Y.2d 901,
200 N.E.2d 779, 252 N.Y.S.2d 96 (1964). "This appeal is not based on the
failure to prosecute others . . . but rather on the contention that this prose-
cution was deliberately and affirmatively directed by officials of the Depart-
ment of Buildings under circumstances which plainly demonstrate purposeful
discrimination." Ibid.
83 Brief for Appellant, p. 8, People v. Walker, supra note 32.
34 Brief for Respondent, p. 21, People v. Walker, supra note 32.
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minority, therefore, concluded that there could be no showing of
intentional discrimination.
Since a substantial right of a party must be prejudiced before
an appellate court can grant a reversal,35 the majority appears to
regard the exclusion of evidence, relating solely to bad motive on
the part of an administrative agency, as prejudicial error. If appel-
lant has been prejudiced by exclusion of evidence which the Supreme
Court has regarded as insufficient to establish the defense,3 6 the
Court of Appeals would appear to be reducing the minimum of
proof demanded by Yick Wo, Ah Sin and Snowden. Therefore,
the New York Court seems to require evidence of only one of the
two elements required by the Supreme Court to demonstrate constitu-
tional deprivation. If this is true, then the majority opinion is
contrary to prior New York law. Nevertheless, it is clearly within
the power of a state to clothe a defendant with greater protection
against unconstitutional invasion of his rights than the minimum
protection demanded by the Supreme Court.
37
Still, reasonable analysis of the necessary and practical im-
plications of such a holding would seem to contraindicate this grant
of greater protection to a guilty defendant. Were the constitutional
protection thus expanded, without making exception, this defense
would be made available to all lawbreakers. Is it not then hypo-
thetically possible that a corrupt union official, who had made personal
use of organization funds, would go free were he able to show
that prosecution was engendered because of a personal vendetta
against him by an attorney general? This would be anomalous to
criminal law as it is known today, for regardless of the motives
of the prosecutor, the policy reasons which led to the enactment
of the penal statute are being carried out, since society is still
being protected from forbidden conduct.38
In accord with the cogent dissents, one is constrained to con-
clude that nullifying the effectiveness of penal administration to
such a great degree, through the expansion of the protection afforded
by the fourteenth amendment, is a manifestly undesirable result;
but, on the other hand, emasculation of the constitutional guarantee,
by subjecting the defendant to insurmountable burdens of proof, is
certainly not a better result.
Perhaps the result of this case might be justified if the majority
based its conclusion on the possibility of a citizen's being coerced
to consent to corrupt practices in order to avoid swift retributive
administrative action.3 9 However, it cannot be assumed that this
was the basis for the decision.
UN.Y. CODE Cam. PRoc. § 542.
36 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1943) ; Ah Sin v. Wittman, 198 U.S.
500 (1905); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
37 Cf. John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583, 585 (1913).
38 Sauer v. United States, 241 F.2d 640, 648 (9th Cir. 1957).
89See DAVIS, AmNIsTRATrmv LAW 75-6 (1959); GELLHORN & BYsE,
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In conclusion, it would appear that in order to avoid the danger
that lower courts will construe this decision as do the dissenting
judges, this case should be viewed as an equivocal opinion designed
to grant the appellant her full day in court, and yet not intended
by the majority to effectuate drastic changes in both criminal and
constitutional law in New York.
JURY TRIAL - SURROGATE'S COURT - ExEcUTRIX HAS RIGHT
To JURY TRIAL UNDER NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION. -
Claimants petitioned for a compulsory accounting in the surrogate's
court nearly six years after the executrix of decedent's estate
rejected their claim for legal services. The executrix answered
that an accounting would be unnecessary since there were no
other claims pending against the estate, the assets of which
were sufficient to meet the claim if it was determined to be valid.
The executrix then demanded a trial by jury of the disputed claim.
In reversing the lower court decisions which rejected this latter
demand, a divided Court of Appeals held that petitioners' claim
was in the nature of an action at law for work, labor and services
for which a trial by jury was preserved by the New York State
Constitution. Matter of Garfield, 14 N.Y.2d 251, 200 N.E.2d
196, 251 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1964).
In 1830 the Revised Statutes of New York conferred upon
the surrogate's courts I the powers of equity formerly utilized in
administration suits in chancery.2 However, it should be noted
that a primary limitation on the equity jurisdiction in administration
suits was the necessity of first establishing disputed claims at law
where claimant would be afforded a jury trial.3 Therefore, in
ADMrNIsTRATIvE LAW 688 n.5 (4th ed. 1960); Vanderbilt, Functions and
Procedure of Administrative Tribunals, 12 U. CINc. L. REv. 117, 119-21(1938); Rourke, Law Enforcement Through Publicity, 24 U. CHr. L. REv.
225, 235 (1957).
1 Before the Revolutionary War the surrogate's court was called the
prerogative court. The colonial governor was its judge and his deputies were
called surrogates. In 1686 these courts were given the powers exercised in
England by the ecclesiastical courts. One of these powers was the settle-
ment and adjustment of executors' accounts. In 1788, by statute, the preroga-
tive court became the surrogate's court. See Malone v. Sts. Peter & Paul
Church, 172 N.Y. 269, 64 N.E. 961 (1902).
2 Matter of Kent, 92 Misc. 113, 120, 155 N.Y. Supp. 383, 387 (Surr.
Ct. 1915); 1 J'ESSuP-REDFmD, LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE SURROGATES'
COURTS IN THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 91 (rev. ed. 1947).
3 Matter of Kent, supra note 2, at 123, 155 N.Y. Supp. at 389.
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